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Abstract 
Merchant renewables are a new asset class.  With historically high cost structures 
and low wholesale prices associated with merit order effects, continuity of entry has 
been reliant on Renewable Portfolio Standards or other policy initiatives such as 
government-initiated Contracts-for-Differences.  But in Australia’s National 
Electricity Market, sharply falling costs of renewables and volatile wholesale market 
conditions from coal plant exits has led to a surprising number of merchant 
intermittent renewable investments. Adding to the merchant renewable fleet are older 
wind plants whose inaugural long-dated PPAs recently matured.  Rolling over PPAs 
is possible, but not necessarily optimal.  In this article, a merchant gas turbine, 
merchant wind, and an integrated portfolio comprising both plants are valued in the 
NEM’s South Australian region.  Asset valuations reveal surprising results.  The 
modelling sequence shows stand-alone gas turbine valuation metrics suffer from 
modest levels of missing money, that merchant wind can commit to some level of 
forward (fixed volume) swap contracts in-spite of intermittent production, but the 
combined portfolio tightens overall valuation metrics significantly.  Above all, the 
combined portfolio is financially tractable, overcoming the missing money for a gas 
turbine plant undertaking peaking duties.  In a NEM region where intermittent 
renewable market share exceeds 50%, this suggests the energy-only, real-time gross 
pool design may yet be deemed suitable vis-à-vis meeting environmental objectives 
and Resource Adequacy.  
 
Keywords:  Merchant renewables, peaking plant, power plant valuations.   
JEL Codes: D61, L94, L11 and Q40. 
 
1. Introduction 
Renewable Portfolio Standards and government-initiated Contracts-for-Differences (CfD) 
have been important policy measures for Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) entry, viz. wind 
and solar PV.  Historically high VRE total average costs meant side-payments were essential 
for entry continuity.  Compounding matters were so-called merit order effects – as more 
priority dispatched VRE entered, the supply curve shifted to the right placing downward 
pressure on clearing prices.  Merit order effects reinforced requirements for side-payments, 
with remaining plant profitability adversely affected.  Plant undertaking peaking duties, 
essential for reliability purposes, are thought to be particularly vulnerable  (Hach and Spinler, 
2016; Höschle et al., 2017; Bublitz et al., 2019; Milstein and Tishler, 2019)2.  This called into 
question whether energy-only markets are able to meet both environmental and Resource 
Adequacy objectives.   
 
In the classic VRE entry case, renewables are placed into Special Purpose Vehicles, project 
financed and underpinned by long-dated run-of-plant Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) 
written by investment-grade utilities in response to Renewable Portfolio Standards 
(~9400MW in Australia’s NEM) or government-initiated CfDs (~1800MW3).  Equity 
invested, usually by infrastructure funds, sought stable running yields over time.  This 
investment model of the ‘non-market facing’ VRE plant will no doubt continue.   
 
♣ Professor of Economics, Griffith Business School, Griffith University.  Views expressed in this article are those of the author.   
♠ Research Associate, Energy Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge. 
1 I am indebted to my friend and colleague Dr Joel Gilmore for his extensive assistance building the Stochastic DCF Valuation 
model used in this research. 
2 It is worth noting that in the NEM, it was baseload plant that were most adversely affected due to higher fixed & sunk costs. 
3 Also includes government-initiated Feed-in Tariffs for utility-scale plant. 
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But sharply falling VRE costs and longer-run business cycle dynamics of merit order effects 
mean alternate entry models are emerging.  In Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) 
a surprising number of VRE plant have entered on a fully merchant basis4 – 18 solar PV 
projects (~1500 MW) and 5 wind projects (~870 MW) reached financial close during 2017-
2019 (Panjkov, 2019).  Moreover, at least 10 mature incumbent wind plants (~600MW) have 
simultaneously found themselves with merchant exposures as inaugural 10-15 year PPAs had 
run full-term. Furthermore, a rising number of VRE entrants (with PPAs) deliberately 
oversized entry capacity to acquire residual merchant exposures (~650MW).  Consequently, 
Australia’s NEM is accumulating a surprising amount of merchant VRE capacity.   
 
From an investment perspective, merchant VRE is a new asset class.  In an energy-only 
market with a Market Price Cap of AUD $14,700/MWh5 – amongst the highest in the world – 
it is probably not an investment class for the feint hearted given stochastic output. Rolling-
over PPAs with incumbent Retailers is possible but may not be profit maximising.6  Indeed as 
this research reveals, managing merchant VRE is no more challenging than managing 
stochastic retail loads.  VRE can participate in spot and forward markets while managing risks 
of ‘high price - low output’ events.   
 
Resource Adequacy in energy-only markets is a matter of constant interest to energy 
economists and policymakers, marked by a growing body of literature (Keay, 2016; Bhagwat 
et al., 2017; Keppler, 2017; Simshauser, 2018; Billimoria and Poudineh, 2019; Bublitz et al., 
2019; Milstein and Tishler, 2019).  Yet even with rising VRE, provided reliability criteria has 
a tight nexus with the Market Price Cap7 there should be no question that investment in 
energy-only markets will flow under conditions of diminishing supply-side reserves.  
Imbalances induce a growing number, and intensity of, price spike events which drives 
investment in new capacity (Simshauser and Gilmore, 2019).   
 
The central question is whether plant investments occur in a timely manner rather than in 
response to a crisis, noting practical political limits exist vis-à-vis the severity and duration of 
wholesale market price shocks (Besser, Farr, and Tierney 2002; Hogan 2005; Simshauser 
2018; Bublitz et al. 2019). The central objective of this article is to analyse the most complex 
of merchant investment commitments in energy-only markets – a price-taking Open Cycle 
Gas Turbine (OCGT) plant undertaking peaking duties, and, merchant wind.  
 
OCGT investments are challenging because predicting peak prices requires much more 
information than prediction of baseload prices.  By their nature, peaking plant operate only 
during power system imbalances – extreme weather events, material plant outages or market 
power events.  And because such events are inherently uncertain, peaking plant income 
streams from spot markets are manifestly random and particularly hazardous (Peluchon, 2003; 
Bidwell and Henney, 2004; Simshauser, 2008). 
 
But markets have a way of navigating uncertainty. Practical evidence from Australia’s NEM 
is that gas turbines have been delivered on a timely basis through altering vertical business 
boundaries.  Of the 7250MW of gas turbine plant developed between 2000-2019, 5350MW 
(75%) was via vertically-integrated merchant utilities8.   This dominant investment thesis had 
its underpinning in real options9 as a ‘physical hedge’ against stochastic customer load.  As 
 
4 Merchant plant sell their output into the spot market and hedge price risk using short-term forward markets.    
5 All financial numbers expressed in AUD unless otherwise specified.  AUD $14,700/MWh equates to ~US$10,143/MWh and 
£7791/MWh (AUD/US ~0.69 and AUD/GBP ~0.53) at the time of writing. 
6 When an Independent Power Producer (IPP) negotiates with a large utility, the threat of not entering is used to avoid sub-
optimal outcomes.  Once a plant is sunk, the IPP loses this credible threat.  
7 In theory, from a power system planning perspective the overall objective function is to minimise 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑥𝑥 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 + ∑ 𝑐𝑐(𝑅𝑅)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  | 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑥𝑥 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 + 𝑐𝑐�𝑅𝑅�� = 0, where 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 is the Value of Lost Load, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is Unserved Energy, and where 𝑐𝑐(𝑅𝑅) is the 
cost generation plant, and 𝑐𝑐�𝑅𝑅�� is the cost of peaking plant capacity.  Provided these conditions hold, it can be said there is a 
direct relationship between Reliability and the Market Price Cap.  An alternate expression where reliability criteria is based on 
Loss of Load Expectation is 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑈𝑈 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈/𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉, where CONE is the cost of new entry.  For an excellent discussion on the 
relationship between a Market Price Cap and reliability criteria, see (Zachary, Wilson and Dent, 2019). 
8 That is, large competitive Retail Supply businesses with generation portfolios, or merchant generators with significantly 
integrated forward Retail Supply positions. 
9 The origins of which can be traced back to (Myers, 1977). 
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vertical investments, gas turbines evidently overcame the many frictions, imperfections and 
bounded rationality that characterise forward electricity markets (Roques, Newbery and 
Nuttall, 2005; Simshauser, Tian and Whish-Wilson, 2015; Newbery, 2016). 
 
Merchant VRE presents an alternate investment thesis for gas turbines.  Just as OCGTs have 
more stable valuations when marked against stochastic customer load, more stable values 
should, in theory, be achievable when marked against market-facing stochastic merchant VRE 
plant.   
 
In the following analysis, OCGT and merchant wind are valued as stand-alone investments, 
then combined as a merchant portfolio.  The rich volatility associated with cyclical and 
structural energy-only market variations are captured using a diverse array of market 
conditions – 100 years of stochastic spot price data with 30-minute resolution based on the 
NEM’s South Australian region, where VRE market share now exceeds 50%.  Non-
convexities, imperfect plant availability and other important features of gas turbines are 
incorporated in a Unit Commitment Model which aggregates and transposes 30-minute data 
into 100 years of annual results.   
 
A Stochastic DCF Valuation Model then uses a Monte Carlo sub-sampling process to 
randomly draw annual results from the Unit Commitment Model to populate each future year 
of the plant’s useful life.  This Monte Carlo sub-sampling process is iterated 500 times to 
produce a valuation distribution for the various merchant generation assets.     
 
Valuation results confirm stand-alone OCGT plant is marginally sub-economic10, and that 
stand-alone wind in Australia’s NEM can commit to a portfolio of forward Swaps (or 2-way 
CfDs) in-spite of intermittent production.  When integrated, OCGT expected returns exceed 
entry costs, and the combined portfolio is found to have a materially tighter distribution of net 
revenues under a very wide range of wholesale market conditions – an important 
characteristic given capital market requirements.  Above all, the combined portfolio seems 
capable of ‘finding the missing money’. 
 
These findings present important implications for policymakers.  Modelling suggest when 
OCGT is integrated with merchant VRE in the NEM, tractable financial results emerge as a 
function of transaction cost economics.11  By implication, the NEM’s energy-only market 
appears capable of delivering peaking plant capacity on an economic basis (i.e. Resource 
Adequacy) with very high levels of VRE (i.e. >50% VRE market share).  Whether these 
results can be generalised to other jurisdictions is contingent on the relative pattern of VRE 
output and the relationship between Dispatch-Weighted and baseload prices. 
 
This article is structured as follows.  Section 2 reviews relevant literature.  Section 3 outlines 
model inputs. Section 4 introduces the suite of models and Section 5 presents results.  
Conclusions follow. 
 
2. Review of Literature 
There is enduring interest in the ability of energy-only markets to deliver power system 
reliability due to adequacy of generation plant returns.  Reliability should ideally be broken 
down into its component parts, viz. Resource Adequacy and System Security12 (Batlle and 
Pérez-Arriaga, 2008).  To be clear, the focus in this article is strictly Resource Adequacy in 
the context of i). energy-only markets ii). with rising VRE, and iii). and the valuation of gas 
turbine plant, each of which are reviewed below.  
 
 
10 At least at this point in the energy market business cycle. 
11 On transaction costs and vertical integration in the NEM, see Simshauser, Tian and Whish-Wilson (2015). 
12 Resource Adequacy means adequate installed plant capacity relative to expected peak demand and is essentially a long run 
concept (given entry lags).  System Security means the configuration of power system resources dispatched and enabled, and 
their ability to deal with credible contingencies – and is thus a real-time concept.  
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2.1 Energy-only markets 
Resource Adequacy concerns in energy-only markets can be loosely traced back to Von der 
Fehr and Harbord (1995) who noted indivisibility of capacity, construction lead-times, lumpy 
entry, investment tenor and policy uncertainty make merchant generation unusually risky 
investments.  Early contributions on peaking plant include (Doorman, 2000; Besser, Farr and 
Tierney, 2002; Stoft, 2002; de Vries, 2003; Oren, 2003; Peluchon, 2003).13 Bublitz et al., 
(2019) provide an excellent summary of the rapidly growing literature in the field.    
Of central concern is the stability of earnings and missing money, a concept formally 
introduced by Cramton and Stoft (2005, 2006).  The central idea behind missing money is net 
revenues earned in energy-only markets are suboptimal cf. expected returns.  Peaking plant 
are thought to be particularly susceptible given manifestly random revenues in organised 
energy-only spot markets (Peluchon, 2003; Simshauser, 2008; Bajo-Buenestado, 2017; 
Keppler, 2017; Milstein and Tishler, 2019). 
 
Economic theory and power system modelling has long demonstrated organised spot markets 
can clear demand reliably and provide suitable investment signals for new capacity 
(Schweppe et al. 1988).  But theory and modelling is based on equilibrium analysis with 
unlimited market price caps, limited political and regulatory interference, and by deduction – 
largely equity capital-funded generation plant able to withstand elongated ‘energy market 
business cycles’ (Simshauser, 2010; Arango and Larsen, 2011; Cepeda and Finon, 2011; 
Bublitz et al., 2019).   
 
Good economic theory often collides with harsh realities of applied corporate finance.  In 
practice, energy-only markets are rarely in equilibrium.  Persistent pricing at marginal cost 
does not result in a stable equilibrium given substantial sunk costs – a problem understood at 
least as far back as (Hotelling, 1938; Boiteux, 1949; Turvey, 1964).  Because merchant 
generators face rigid debt repayment schedules, theories of organised spot markets suffer 
from an inadequate treatment of how non-trivial sunk capital costs are financed (Joskow, 
2006; Finon, 2008; Caplan, 2012).14   
 
Generator pricing must deviate from strict marginal cost at some point, but given oligopolistic 
market settings distinguishing between loss-minimising behaviour and an abuse of market 
power is difficult (Cramton and Stoft, 2005, 2008; Roques, Newbery and Nuttall, 2005; 
Joskow, 2008; Simshauser, 2008).  Further, actions by regulatory authorities and System 
Operators frequently suppress legitimate price signals (Joskow, 2008; Hogan, 2013; Spees, 
Newell and Pfeifenberger, 2013; Leautier, 2016)15.  Australia’s NEM is also suffering from 
various forms of political interference (Simshauser, 2019b; Wood, Dundas and Percival, 
2019).  
 
Risks to timely entry may arise from capital constraints.  In the early phases of the global 
restructuring and deregulation experiment, a vast fleet of merchant plant was project financed 
on the basis of forecast spot prices and short term forward contracts (Joskow, 2006; Finon, 
2008; Simshauser, 2008).16  But recurring damage to merchant generator profit & loss 
statements, a product of structural oversupply and episodes of missing money, eventually led 
project banks to tighten risk tolerances and credit metrics (Simshauser, 2010).17   
 
13 See also (Bushnell, 2004; Wen, Wu and Ni, 2004; Neuhoff and De Vries, 2004; Hogan, 2005, 2013; Roques, Newbery and 
Nuttall, 2005; Cramton and Stoft, 2006; Simshauser, 2008; Finon, 2008; Finon and Pignon, 2008; Joskow, 2008; Spees, Newell 
and Pfeifenberger, 2013; Cramton, Ockenfels and Stoft, 2013).  Entire editions of academic journals have been dedicated to the 
topic.  See for example Utilities Policy Volume 16 (2008) or Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy Volume 2 (2013). 
14 Fixed and sunk costs in energy-only markets are, in theory, recovered during price spike events.  But participants are unable to 
optimise the frequency and intensity of price spikes (Cramton and Stoft, 2005).  Moreover Market Price Caps are frequently set 
too low (Batlle and Pérez-Arriaga, 2008; Joskow, 2008; Petitet, Finon and Janssen, 2017; Bublitz et al., 2019; Milstein and 
Tishler, 2019) in which case a stable financial equilibrium can only be reached if the power system is operating near the edge of 
collapse (Bidwell and Henney, 2004; Simshauser and Ariyaratnam, 2014). 
15 See also (Besser, Farr and Tierney, 2002; de Vries, 2003; Oren, 2003; Wen, Wu and Ni, 2004; Batlle and Pérez-Arriaga, 2008; 
Finon and Pignon, 2008). 
16 This included 230,000MW in the US, 13,000MW in Australia and more than 6000MW of new plant in the UK.  See (Joskow, 
2006; Finon, 2008; Simshauser, 2010) for details.  
17 By 2005, more than 110,000 MW of merchant plant in the US, much of the Australian merchant fleet and various high profile 
plant in the UK (e.g. Drax) experienced financial distress or bankruptcy (Joskow, 2006; Finon, 2008; Simshauser, 2010).  
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Of central importance is ‘incomplete markets’ – the seeming inability of energy-only markets 
to deliver the optimal mix of derivative instruments required to facilitate efficient plant entry, 
specifically, long-dated contracts sought by risk averse project banks (Joskow, 2006; Chao, 
Oren and Wilson, 2008; Howell, Meade and O’Connor, 2010; Meade and O’Connor, 2011; 
Caplan, 2012; Meyer, 2012; Nelson and Simshauser, 2013; Newbery, 2017, 2016; Grubb and 
Newbery, 2018; Bublitz et al., 2019).   
 
Australia’s NEM is noted for favourable forward market liquidity as Figure 1 illustrates.18 But 
activity only spans 3 years, well short of optimal financing comprising 5-12 year semi-
permanent project debt facilities set within 18+ year structures.   
 NEM forward market liquidity 1999-2019 
 
Sources: AFMA, AEMO. 
 
Collectively, these characteristics create risks for timely investment required to meet power 
system reliability criteria (Bidwell and Henney, 2004; Cramton and Stoft, 2006; de Vries and 
Heijnen, 2008; Roques, 2008; Hirth, Ueckerdt and Edenhofer, 2016).  Concerns over 
Resource Adequacy are compounded by the fact that large segments of real-time aggregate 
demand are price-inelastic and unable to react to scarcity conditions, and similarly in the short 
run, supply is inelastic because storage remains costly (Batlle and Pérez-Arriaga, 2008; 
Cramton and Stoft, 2008; Finon and Pignon, 2008; Roques, 2008; Bublitz et al., 2019).   
 
In Australia’s NEM, vertical integration became the means by which to deal with the unique 
characteristics of merchant plant and the complexity of writing long-dated contracts.  This 
complexity includes high asset specificity, bounded rationality, asymmetric information 
between generators and retailers, long asset lives, and unusually high financial hazards with 
ex-ante capital-intensive investment commitments (Roques, Newbery and Nuttall, 2005; 
Simshauser, 2010; Simshauser, Tian and Whish-Wilson, 2015).19     
 
Consequently, the canonical merchant generator model became un-bankable in the absence of long-term contracts (Finon, 2008, 
2011).  There is considerable evidence to suggest timely entry on a purely stand-alone merchant basis is intractable in energy-
only markets (Joskow, 2006; Howell, Meade and O’Connor, 2010; Simshauser, 2010; Caplan, 2012; Nelson and Simshauser, 
2013).   
18 See for example (Chester, 2006; Anderson, Hu and Winchester, 2007; Howell, Meade and O’Connor, 2010; Simshauser, Tian 
and Whish-Wilson, 2015). 
19 Three broad policy remedies are typically suggested to deal with the missing money and risks to timely investment viz. (1) 
introducing capacity markets or strategic reserves, (2) raising the Market Price Cap, or (3) introducing additional Operating 
Reserves.  On capacity markets see (Bidwell and Henney, 2004; Green and Staffell, 2016).  On setting higher VoLL and Vertical 
Integration see for example (Joskow, 2006; Finon, 2008; Simshauser, Tian and Whish-Wilson, 2015).  On increasing the 
requirement for operating reserves and enhancing reliability of supply see (Hogan, 2005, 2013).  (Hogan, 2013) notes there is no 
simple way to observe and measure delivery in Capacity Markets.  Conversely, (Cramton and Stoft, 2008) observe that even if 
capacity is overbuilt as a result of capacity mechanisms, the incremental cost to consumers is small because excess ‘peaking 
plant’ is the cheapest form of capacity (viz. an extra 10% of peak capacity may increase consumer costs by say 2%).  
Additionally, (Spees, Newell and Pfeifenberger, 2013) observe that on balance capacity markets in the US have delivered good 
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2.2 On VRE 
Near-zero marginal running costs of VRE plant, subsidised through side-markets, are thought 
to destabilise energy-only markets through merit order effects20.  The basic principle 
underpinning the merit order effect is (subsidised) zero marginal cost VRE plant enters at the 
bottom of the merit order of plant, thus shifting the long-flat base load component of a power 
system’s aggregate supply function to the right. Ceteris paribus, prices fall (Sensfuß et al. 
2008).   
 
I will refer to this as the generalised merit order effect, i.e. plant oversupply causes prices to 
fall. A diverse field of literature analyses whether the cost of obtaining generalised merit 
order effects (i.e. side payments) are justified by falls in price.21   
 
VRE entry produces multiple effects, over multiple time-horizons.  In the NEM, the diurnal 
pattern of wind has an off-peak bias, and solar PV has a peak bias22.  The first VRE plant 
installed in a large thermal system is therefore likely to earn a Dispatch-Weighted Price 
slightly below (wind) or well above (solar) average baseload prices (Mills, Wiser and 
Lawrence, 2012; Nicolosi, 2012; Hirth, 2013; Simshauser, 2018). But as more VRE plant 
enters a series of price and production effects become visible over the short, medium and long 
run – not all of these leading to lower prices.  Consequently, generalised merit order effects 
need to be decomposed across a full energy market business cycle:   
 
1. Holding aggregate demand constant, adding any form of new supply (VRE, coal, 
nuclear, transmission interconnect) produces a merit order effect.  Merit order effects 
are not specific to VRE (Felder, 2011; Nelson, Simshauser and Nelson, 2012).  But 
VRE does produce unique dynamics (Hirth, 2013; Simshauser, 2018; Johnson and 
Oliver, 2019). 
 
2. VRE price impression effects arise from a given technology’s correlated production, 
driven by cumulative ‘VRE plant on’.  The first solar plant will earn a price well 
above baseload prices.  The addition of other stochastic, but correlated plant from that 
asset class shifts the (short-run) aggregate supply curve to the right.  This has an 
impressing impact – exerting a technology-specific downward pressure on spot prices 
at certain times (Mills, Wiser and Lawrence, 2012; Nicolosi, 2012).  Consequently, 
Dispatch-Weighted Prices of wind or solar as an asset class can be expected to 
deteriorate within a region relative to base prices as more of that technology class 
enters (Edenhofer et al., 2013; Hirth, Ueckerdt and Edenhofer, 2016).   
 
3. VRE stochastic production effects arise as a result of cumulative ‘VRE plant off’.  
When wind or solar output is low, the (short run) aggregate supply curve shifts back 
to the left and when combined with fluctuating demand can be expected to intensify 
price volatility – producing distinctly elevated prices (Clò, Cataldi and Zoppoli, 
2015).  Johnson and Oliver (2019) identify conditions whereby stochastic production 
effects dominate price impression effects. 
 
Figure 2 depicts price impression effects from cumulative VRE solar on and stochastic 
production effects from cumulative VRE solar off via August 2019 average 30-minute spot 
price data from the NEM’s Queensland Region (i.e. high levels of utility-scale and rooftop 
solar PV). 
 
results in that they met their objective function, mobilised large amounts of low cost supply including Demand Response, energy 
efficiency, transmission interconnection, plant upgrades, deferred retirements and environmental retrofits.  
20 Various countries including Germany, Denmark, Spain, Australia and North America are now routinely experiencing negative 
spot prices (Bunn and Yusupov, 2015). 
21 See (Sensfuß, Ragwitz and Genoese, 2008; Forrest and MacGill, 2013; Joskow, 2013; Cludius, Forrest and MacGill, 2014; 
Bell et al., 2015, 2017; Keay, 2016; Newbery, 2016; Green and Staffell, 2016; Hach and Spinler, 2016; Keppler, 2017; 
Lunackova, Prusa and Janda, 2017; Benhmad and Percebois, 2018; Bublitz et al., 2019; Johnson and Oliver, 2019). 
22 Peak and off-peak being defined in the traditional sense; peak being nominally 7am-10pm working weekdays.  As one 
Reviewer also noted, solar PV output in cold-climate countries is not well correlated with peak demand – at least by comparison 
to hot climate jurisdictions, such as South Australia, Queensland and California, for example. 
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 VRE price impression effect and VRE stochastic production effect 
 
Data: AEMO 
 
4. Thermal plant flexibility effects amplify price impression effects.  When VRE fleet 
output is high and spot prices fall below unit fuel costs, thermal plant can only reduce 
output to minimum stable loads.  Generalised merit order effects therefore comprise 
two distinct downward forces, price impression effects, amplified by thermal plant 
overproduction due to flexibility limits (Nicolosi, 2012; Bunn and Yusupov, 2015).  
Figure 3 illustrates flexibility effects, contrasting average August 2019 output from a 
280MW coal-fired unit in Queensland (RHS axis) with average spot prices (LHS 
axis).   
 Thermal plant flexibility effect 
 
Data: AEMO 
 
5. Utilisation effects follow.  Inflexible coal plant are adversely impacted by two forces; 
i). lower average prices in the post-VRE entry environment, and ii). progressively 
lower output, ultimately falling to some minimum critical level (Höschle et al., 2017).  
Given suboptimal output levels and heavy sunk costs, coal plant begin to ‘slide up’ 
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their average cost function.  Simultaneously confronting falling prices, the marginal 
coal plant becomes sub-economic and exits (Hirth, 2013; Simshauser, 2018).   
 
Utilisation effects are the crucial long run corollary to short/medium-run generalised merit 
order effects.  Figure 4 illustrates Northern Power Station’s utilisation effect, the last coal 
plant in the NEM’s South Australian region which had historically been #1 in the merit order.   
 Thermal plant ‘utilisation effect’ 
 
Data: AEMO 
 
6. Following cumulative coal plant exit, a rebound effect follows.  Generalised merit 
order effects associated with oversupply rapidly unwind (Felder, 2011; Nelson, 
Simshauser and Nelson, 2012; Hirth, 2013, 2015; Simshauser, 2018, 2019a, 2019b).  
To be clear, this is a long run dynamic.  Figure 5, which presents NEM average 
annual electricity prices from 1999-2019, highlights rebound effects following the 
cumulative exit of 11 coal plants (~5100MW or 18% of the thermal plant stock) 
between 2012-2017.23 
 Rebound Effect24 
 
Source: Simshauser & Gilmore (2019), ABS, AEMO. 
 
23 The final two generators in 2016 (Northern, South Australian region) and 2017 (Hazelwood, in the Victorian region) 
represented a distinct tipping point in the market. 
24 Note that the data in Figure 5 excludes the $23/t CO2 carbon tax applicable in 2013 and 2014. 
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The combination and sequencing of these effects over a full energy market business cycle 
should come as no surprise (Felder, 2011; Nelson, Simshauser and Nelson, 2012; Simshauser, 
2019a).  After all, the purpose of VRE side-markets is to induce new entry and transition the 
supply-side of energy markets, includes phasing out coal plant.  There is no reason to believe 
such policies will not be successful in the long run.  This has important implications for 
OCGT plant valuations. 
 
2.3 On the valuation of OCGT plant 
A rich and diverse literature on generation plant valuation exists, spanning technologies, 
financing structures and business models including merchant, tolled, and PPA-contracted 
assets (Gardner and Zhuang, 2000; Deng, Johnson and Sogomonian, 2001; Tseng and Barz, 
2002; Hlouskova et al., 2005; Hogan, 2005; Abadie and Chamorro, 2008; Heydari and 
Siddiqui, 2010; Fernandes, Cunha and Ferreira, 2011; Elias, Wahab and Fang, 2016; 
Simshauser and Gilmore, 2019).   
 
Of central importance to the valuation of gas turbine plant is the real option value of the 
expected difference between the price of electricity and unit fuel costs (i.e. a function of plant 
heat rate and cost of natural gas) known as the Spark Spread.  The range of modelled prices, 
price resolution, and plant valuation approaches to spread options is extensive.  There are four 
broad streams involving the use of futures prices and/or some form of mean-reverting or 
random walk forecasting process (see Baker, Mayfield and Parsons, 1998; Pindyck, 1999): 
 
1. Simple spread options using futures data, solved analytically and assuming perfect 
plant flexibility and plant availability (Deng, Johnson and Sogomonian, 2001; 
Carmona and Durrleman, 2003; Fleten and Näsäkkälä, 2010);  
 
2. Tree methods, which emerged to solve optimal investment and unit commitment 
decisions by relaxing the simplifying assumptions around physical plant 
characteristics and non-convexities – incorporating start-up costs, ramp rate 
constraints, minimum run times and random outages (Gardner and Zhuang, 2000; 
Tseng and Lin, 2007; Abadie and Chamorro, 2008; Elias, Wahab and Fang, 2016, 
2017);     
 
3. Real options approach incorporating Monte Carlo simulation techniques to capture 
underlying stochastic factors known to be important drivers of value (Tseng and Barz, 
2002; Hlouskova et al., 2005; Heydari and Siddiqui, 2010; Cassano and Sick, 2013; 
Wang and Min, 2013; Abadie, 2015) 25; and  
 
4. Power system simulation models or ‘structural models’ which capture system-wide 
plant availability and load variability driven by anthropogenic patterns and 
seasonality with specific results fed into a conventional Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 
Model.26  Contemporary power system models simulate hundreds of generation and 
spot price scenarios for a given (inelastic) load curve, with an objective function of 
cost minimisation subject to reliability constraints.  Structural models are particularly 
well-suited to providing insight into causes of intermediate-run fluctuations, but are 
data (and processing-) intensive (Pindyck, 1999).27   
 
The modelling sequence in this research lies between the 3rd and 4th streams. 
 
25 (Cassano and Sick, 2013) is a particularly interesting analysis where they model 2 x LM6000 and a Steam Turbine, and model 
all plausible operating modes (i.e. cold off, idle, open cycle and combined cycle) as a call option over the spark spread – 
converting the two dimensional problem into one by using the market heat rate (i.e. electricity divided by gas price) based on the 
principles of (Margrabe, 1978).  Using a bootstrap process to simulate future heat rates, they find the average market heat rate is 
a good explanatory variable for the time integral of the plant operating margin. 
26 Structural models in the electricity industry are typically security-constrained, unit commitment models with an engine 
comprising a Monte Carlo-based Linear Programme – the design of which can be traced back to the joint work by Electricite de 
France Chief Economist Marcel Boiteux and State Electricity Commission of Victoria Chief Engineer Dr Rob Booth – applying 
the principles of (Calabrese, 1947), (Boiteux, 1949), (Berrie, 1967) and (Booth, 1972).   
27 And if estimates of technology long run marginal costs are comparatively stable over time, such models are capable of 
providing helpful insights beyond the intermediate-run.  The usual caveats apply. 
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3. Valuation model inputs 
For applied transaction purposes, plant valuation ideally involves the triangulation of three 
pieces of analysis; i). DCF Model based on an energy price forecast, ii). estimated 
replacement cost, and iii). recent comparable transactions.  The purpose of this article is to 
focus on the first of these (i.e. modelled result) for three specific merchant business 
combinations: 
 
1. new entrant 3 x 30MW aero-derivative OCGT; 
  
2. incumbent 250MW Wind Portfolio, Annual Capacity Factor (ACF) of ~31%; and   
 
3. integrated portfolio comprising 1). and 2). above. 
 
Generation assets are strictly merchant meaning output is sold into organised spot markets 
and hedged in short-term forward markets (Nelson and Simshauser, 2013; Wang and Min, 
2013).  There are no long-dated contracts – this includes Wind plant, its inaugural PPA is 
assumed to have expired.   
 
3.1 OCGT Plant 
OCGT valuations in energy-only markets are complex because unlike base, semi-base and 
VRE plant which have relatively constant load factors, peaking duties involves extensive 
variations in ACFs – some years operating as little as 1% – prima facie making bankability 
problematic (Simshauser, 2010; Finon, 2011; Caplan, 2012; Nelson and Simshauser, 2013; 
Keppler, 2017; Bublitz et al., 2019; Milstein and Tishler, 2019).  As Peluchon (2003, p2) 
noted long ago: 
 
Peak capacity investment, especially, seems quite problematic. An investment in base 
generation plant is a decision that requires forecasting base future prices. An 
investment in peak generation plant is a decision that requires much more 
information as peak prices depend on base prices as well as from the future 
investments in every other kind of generation capacity. The revenue generated by 
peak plant is therefore much more hazardous than base plant, since it produces only 
when every other plant produces at full capacity or cannot produce. In the same way 
an option is said to be ‘out-of-the-money’, peak plant has a value that may change 
drastically with any change in the way the supply-demand balance evolves . . . 
 
Of critical importance is the inclusion of forward contracts as these stabilise expected 
revenues.  In the NEM, the relevant forward derivative contract is the $300 Cap28.  The plant 
being valued is 3 x GE LM2500 gas turbines with an installed capacity of 97.5MW at ISO29, 
and 90MW at summer-rated site conditions (Table 1).  In the circumstances, it is helpful to 
consider the valuation for an M&A transaction involving new plant30.  Aeroderivative GTs 
are ideally suited for integrating with merchant wind due to their rapid starting profile – from 
cold iron to full load in five minutes without restriction.31  Table 1 presents relevant technical 
and financial data.   
 
 
28 The $300 Cap is traded both on-exchange and in the Over-The-Counter market. 
29 Ambient temperature, altitude and humidity affect Gas Turbine output and performance (ie. Power output is dependent on the 
mass flow through the compressor, and as air density decreases, more power is required to compress the same mass of air, which 
reduces output and thermal efficiency).  Consequently, the standard reference conditions for Gas Turbine Plant (ISO 3977) are 
15oC, 101.3 kPa. 
30 An M&A transaction involves an overnight transaction, and thus avoids detailed construction cash flow modelling. 
31 LM2500s are a mature technology with 2460 units in service globally, having collectively accumulated 92 million operating 
hours. My thanks to the team at GE Australia. 
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 Gas Turbine Data 
 
 
3.2 Modelled spot prices 
The critical variable in any plant valuation exercise is the commodity price forecast (Pindyck, 
1999).  NEM forward prices span 36 months and given the capital-intensive nature of 
equipment, long-dated investment horizon and tenor of any semi-permanent debt structure 
subsequently deployed – longer-term modelled prices are necessary.  Structural models are 
almost exclusively used for this purpose by NEM practitioners (i.e. utilities, equity investors, 
project banks) in M&A transactions and greenfield investment commitments alike.   
 
Security-constrained unit commitment models are built on a mean-reverting equilibrium 
framework, with 30-minute resolution Monte Carlo LP engines generating dozens of 
simulation scenarios for a given load curve.  An average of simulation runs is then rolled-up 
for use in DCF Models with Quarterly or Annual resolution.  The averaging process makes 
these models particularly well-suited for base, semi-base and VRE plant valuations with a 
special focus over the relative near-term (Pindyck, 1999) – notionally, the 3-5 year window 
for which existing Boards, Executive Management, Investment and Credit Committees of the 
NEM practitioners are held directly accountable for.   
 
This same process is not, however, well suited for merchant OCGT plant undertaking peaking 
duties in energy-only markets.  Power system simulation models are designed to revert to 
equilibrium and tend to understate sharp and volatile changes in system conditions that 
prevail in practice, such as transient system constraints and extreme weather events.  
Modelled outputs are further smoothed prior to being transposed to DCF Models because the 
dozens of simulation results are averaged.  In the real world, a single final result – frequently 
off-equilibrium – prevails.  Being able to generate power strategically, or withdraw quickly, is 
a source of considerable value (Cassano and Sick, 2013).  Capturing extremities of the 
physical spot market, and physical constraints that accompany OCGT unit commitment is 
therefore, in my opinion, essential to any OCGT plant valuation process.  Ignoring the former 
understates plant valuations, and ignoring the latter overstates plant valuations. 
 
Rather than use a structural model, in this article 100 years of stochastic spot price data 
(n=100) at 30-minute resolution (t = 17,520) has been generated from historic South 
Gas Turbine LM2500 Aeroderivative
Technical Data
Rated Capacity at ISO 32.5                   MW
Max Capacity at Site 30.0                   MW
Minimum Stable Load 3.0                     MW
Thermal Efficiency 34.0                   % HHV
Heat Rate Full Load 9.5                      GJ/MWh
Start-up Fuel Use 23.75 GJ
Start-up Time (Cold Sta 5 Minutes
Ramp Rate 240 MW/min
Hot Path Inspections 25000 Fired Hours
Overhaul 50000 Fired Hours
Financial Data
Capital Cost $1,050 per kW installed
Unit Gas Cost $9.50 per GJ*
Gas Transportation $1.00 per GJ
Variable O&M $10 per MWh
Fixed O&M $2,200,000 per annum
Insurance $500,000 per annum
* In the NEM's day-ahead gas markets prices fluctuate between $4.00 - $14/GJ.  In this analysis, 
a fixed gas price of $9.50/GJ is used.  As a peaking plant with very low ACFs, the use of dynamic 
gas prices would marginally improve modelling results - noting its primary purpose is to defend 
$300 Caps (i.e. equivalent gas price of $29/GJ) .  
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Australian NEM region data.32  The benefit of using South Australian spot (and forward) data 
over the 10-year period 2010-2019 as a base is that the price series captures a complete 
energy market business cycle comprising:  
 
1. Over-capacity and well documented merit order effects33 arising from cumulative 
wind and solar PV entry to world-record market shares of 50+%, and  
 
2. severe supply-side shocks (i.e. rebound effects) arising from cumulative thermal plant 
exit (see Simshauser, 2019a). 
 
Summary statistics of the 10-year historic/actuals and 100-year stochastic spot price data set 
(annual results) are presented in Table 2 and Figure 6.34   
 
 Statistical summary of Annual Spot Prices 
Panel A: Actual (2010-2019) vs. Modelled (n=100) 
 
 
Panel B: Stochastic Spot Price Data (Annual) Probability of Exceedance (PoE) 
 
 
Of critical importance for OCGT valuation (and Cap derivative modelling) purposes is intra-
year spot price volatility.  Figure 6 illustrates the dispersion of the stochastic spot price data 
set (annual average price, x-axis) and intra-year volatility (measured by the contribution to 
average prices from > $300/MWh price spike events, y-axis).  Note the overall average spot 
price is ~$73/MWh35, of which the contribution from volatility events (>$300/MWh) is 
$10/MWh.36   
  
 
32 Historic spot prices from 2012-2019 are used as a base, and are then both scaled and sampled to amplify average price and 
price volatility. 
33 See for example (Forrest and MacGill, 2013; Cludius, Forrest and MacGill, 2014). 
34 Australia had a carbon tax from 2012-2014.  Historic data used to build the stochastic data set included this period and 
consequently ~30 out of 100 years includes an explicit price on carbon.  Inclusion in all years would in theory increase the value 
of the wind plant, and marginally reduce the value of the OCGT plant.  Note in subsequent years (e.g. 2016-2019) average spot 
prices were higher with similar volatility to the carbon tax period. 
35 The average spot price of $73/MWh is marginally below the 2016-2020 entry cost benchmark of $75-80/MWh in Simshauser 
& Gilmore (2019).  This trivial difference is not important to the analysis undertaken in this research in that higher average prices 
would only serve to further reinforce (i.e. would not reverse) the findings in Section 5. 
36 Alternatively put, the underlying average spot price excluding volatility events is $63/MWh (i.e. $73/MWh - $10/MWh), and 
the ex post Fair Value of $300/MWh Caps is $10/MWh. 
Historic Spot 
Prices
Stochastic Spot 
Prices
Observations (n =) 10                      100                       
                      (t =) 175,200             1,752,000            
Annual Average Price 72.36                 73.15                    
Std Deviation 25.58                 24.47                    
Coeff. of Variation 0.35                   0.33                      
PoE5 Price 105.92               110.00                  
PoE95 Priec 46.03                 37.89                    
Maximum Price 109.29               117.92                  
Minimum Price 43.79                 29.01                    
Probability of Exceedance 1% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 100%
Scenario Year (n=100) (n) 89 71 10 30 91 51 21
Trading Intervals (t=17520) (t) 17520 17520 17520 17520 17520 17520 17520
Average Spot Price ($/MWh) 117.92 110.00 95.91 72.90 51.09 37.89 29.01
Standard Deviation  ($/MWh) 398.71 269.67 267.58 242.32 115.78 131.91 81.40
Coeff. of Variation  ($/MWh) 3.38 2.45 2.79 3.32 2.27 3.48 2.81
Volatility > $300     ($/MWh) 21.73 14.69 10.26 9.58 3.03 5.51 3.33
Frequency of > $300 events  (t) 500 457 123 171 39 80 20
Frequency of > $1000 events (t) 35 30 48 25 13 21 8
Frequency of Negative Prices (t) 275 138 209 742 72 154 154
Frequency of Negative Prices (%) 1.6 0.8 1.2 4.2 0.4 0.9 0.9
Wind Dispatch Weighted Price (%) 82.1 81.5 86.9 83.6 89.5 76.6 77.3
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 Stochastic spot prices – Annual Average vs Annual Volatility (>$300 spikes) 
 
 
 
3.3 Wind and Dispatch-Weighted Price 
For valuation purposes the wind plant is assumed to have a (depreciated) capital-cost base of 
$1750/kW, Fixed O&M costs of $10,000/MW installed and Variable O&M costs of 
$12/MWh with an average ACF of 32.1% (min 28.2% and max 33.9%).  Note subsequent 
analysis excludes any form of side-market (i.e. Renewable Certificate37) revenues.   
 
An important variable in the subsequent analysis is the ‘earned price’ of wind turbine 
generators (i.e. Dispatch-Weighted Price).  As an absolute general conclusion, the annual 
Dispatch-Weighted Price cannot be greater than the time-weighted spot price because: 
 
• NEM wind generation output tends to have an off-peak bias; and 
 
• When demand is higher than forecast, all else equal, dispatchable generators increase 
output and receive a higher average price.  Conversely, stochastic generators reduce 
output disproportionately in periods of oversupply and hence sell at 
disproportionately lower prices (Joskow, 2011; Mills, Wiser and Lawrence, 2012; 
Edenhofer et al., 2013; Hirth, 2013; Simshauser, 2018).   
 
Consequently, the annual Dispatch-Weighted Price will be less than 100% of the time-
weighted spot price – particularly as wind market share increases.38  This critical relationship 
must be maintained between the 100 years of stochastic 30-minute spot price data and 30-
minute wind production data.  If not, wind plant valuation results will almost certainly be 
over-stated.39   Figure 7 confirms the Dispatch-Weighted Price of the merchant 250MW Wind 
ranges from 77-91% (average = 84%)40. 
  
 
37 In practice this would add ~$100-$150m to plant valuations. 
38 As an aside, for solar PV at-scale it is even more pronounced as Figure 2 tends to suggest.  See also (Mills, Wiser and 
Lawrence, 2012; Nicolosi, 2012; Hirth, 2013; Simshauser, 2018).   
39 I should note that there are a small number of wind farms in the NEM that have Dispatch-Weighted Prices (DWP) with near 
perfect correlation to baseload prices, year-on-year.  I am not aware of any wind farms with a DWP materially exceeding 
baseload prices.  
40 Dispatch-Weighted Prices (%) are based on historic data from three wind farms in South Australia over the period 2012-2019. 
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 Spot Price vs Wind Portfolio Dispatch Weighted Price (% of Time Weighted) 
 
 
3.4 Modelled $300 Cap Futures 
Incorporating forward market revenues is a critical component of any merchant plant 
valuation exercise.  Merchant plant does not mean ‘spot sales only’.  The sale of forward 
derivatives are essential from a cashflow management perspective, and drive unit 
commitment.  In Australian financial markets the two most commonly traded electricity 
derivatives are Swaps and $300 Caps41, the latter being the forward contract of choice to 
manage risks associated with load uncertainty and extreme price spike events.  The traded 
history of $300 Caps in the NEM’s SA region (daily resolution) is presented in Figure 8. 
 $300 Cap Futures – Calendar Year Strips 2008-2021 (constant 2019 dollars) 
 
Source: ASX, ABS. 
 
The theoretical equilibrium price of $300 Caps can be derived by calculating a Boiteux 
Capacity Payment, viz. carrying cost of an OCGT undertaking ‘reserve duties’, expressed in $ 
per MW per hour.  Given OCGT cost data in Table 1, this equates to ~$14/MWh.42   
 
 
41 $300 is a long-standing NEM convention that provides sufficient headroom for all peaking plant to be economically dispatched 
even if operating on liquid fuels. 
42 See Simshauser & Gilmore (2019, p269) for a detailed analysis of the calculation using the ‘PF Model’ with both on- and off-
Balance Sheet financing structures. 
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Ex ante, $300 Caps trade at a premium to their ex post Fair Value – an expected result given 
the nature of the instrument.43  Figure 9 re-organises Figure 8 data into a ‘3-Year 
Accumulated Portfolio’ price trace (solid line series) over the 10-year period 2010-2019.  The 
Accumulated Portfolio involves progressively layering Caps into a portfolio over the three-
year period leading up to real-time.  The 10-Year ex ante average traded Cap Price, and ex 
post average Cap Settlement is also illustrated (dashed and dotted line series), revealing an ex 
ante Cap premium of ~30%.     
 3-Year Accumulated Portfolio of $300 Cap & Cap Payouts (2010-2019) 
 
Source: ASX, AEMO, ABS. 
 
Table 3 presents a statistical summary of Traded Caps, their ex post Fair Value, and a 
comparison between the historic/actual 3-Year Accumulated Portfolio (2010-2019) and 
modelled 3-Year Accumulated Portfolio used in this research, which has been estimated via 
Eq.(1).  Note Eq.(1) modelled prices for the Accumulated Portfolio are broadly consistent 
with the historic 2010-2019 Accumulated Portfolio, viz. 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 ≅ $13/𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ, 𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐 ≅ $3/𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ 
with Coefficient of Variation ~0.24. 
 
 10-Year Statistical summary of $300 Cap Strips (2010-2019) – Actual and Modelled 
 
Source: ASX, AEMO (for Traded Caps and Fair Value ex post) 
The modelled 3-Year Accumulated Portfolio of $300 Caps is tightly aligned with the 
stochastic spot price data set, as follows:   
 
𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐
𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 − (2.25 ∙ 𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐) + ��𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛−1,𝑖𝑖 + 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖� 2⁄ � ∙ (1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐) | 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 = 𝜇𝜇 − 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐 , (1) 
where: 
𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐
𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 = modelled prices of an Accumulated Portfolio of $300 Caps c in year n and 
 
43 Caps are an insurance product used by Retail Suppliers to manage risk exposures associated with  extreme weather events – 
events which by their nature are only likely to occur 1-in-10 years.  For Retailers, dual-impacts of high price and high volumes 
raises the possibility of financial distress. 
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Contract Premium ~30%
Avg of Traded 
$300 Caps
Fair Value $300 
Cap Ex Post
2010-19 $300 Cap 
Accum. Portfolio
Modelled $300 Cap  
Accum. Portfolio
Observations 6,933              10                    10                       500                        
Average 12.84             10.00                12.98                   12.91                     
Std Deviation 4.49               5.09                 2.96                    3.05                       
Coeff. Variation 0.35               0.51                 0.23                    0.24                       
Min 6.32               1.65                 8.90                    `7.46
Max 29.40             17.67                17.51                   `17.69
`Sample results from a single 25 Year Simulation.  
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                 iteration i (and i = 1..500) 
𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 = long run average of the 3-Year Accumulated Portfolio of $300 Caps 
𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐 = standard deviation of the 3-Year Accumulated Portfolio of $300 Caps 
𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐
𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 = ex post Fair Value (i.e. payout) of $300 Caps from stochastic spot prices in  
   year n and iteration i 
𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 = long run observable Cap Premium (30%, per Figure 9) 
 
Figure 10 illustrates 10 samples of modelled ‘Accumulated Portfolio of $300 Caps’ traces 
(i.e. i=10 of 500 iterations, n=25 years, the nominal project life for valuation purposes).  Cap 
prices ($/MWh) are measured on the y-axis for each valuation year n on the x-axis.   
 Modelled Accumulated Portfolio of $300 Caps vs Entry Cost (i=1..10 of 500) 
 
 
3.5 Modelled Swaps 
Swaps form an essential component of forward revenues associated with the merchant Wind 
Portfolio, and the integrated Wind and OCGT portfolio.  The traded history of Swaps in the 
South Australian region (2008-2021) are presented in Figure 11.   
 Calendar Year Swap Strips 2008-2021 (constant 2019 dollars) 
 
Source: ASX, ABS. 
 
Historically, swaps trade at an ex ante c.5-7% premium relative to their ex post Fair Value in 
between cyclical highs (e.g. 2010-2016).  However, the surge in volatility from mid-2016 led 
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to a reversal with swap prices trading at $69/MWh compared to an ex post Fair Value of 
$73/MWh over the full 2010-2019 cycle.44  This is illustrated in Figure 12 (see also Table 4). 
 3-Year Accumulated Portfolio of Swaps & Swap Payouts (2010-2019) 
 
Table 4 presents the statistical summary of Traded Swaps, the ex post Fair Value of Swaps, 
and a comparison between the historic/actual 3-Year Accumulated Portfolio (2010-2019) of 
Swaps, and Modelled 3-Year Accumulated Portfolio of Swaps used in this research.   
 
 10-Year statistical summary of Swap Strips (2010-2019) – Actual and Modelled 
 
Source: ASX, AEMO (for Traded Swaps and Fair Value ex post) 
 
As with modelled Caps, modelled Swaps are estimated via Eq.(2) and linked to the stochastic 
spot price data set (i.e. average of ~$73/MWh) with a modest positive Swap premium.  
Modelled Accumulated Portfolio swap prices are marginally higher than historic/actuals (𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 = 
$73.83 vs $69.36), with measures of volatility also marginally higher (𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 = $13 vs $12, 
Coefficient of Variation 0.18 vs 0.17).  Wider variations at the PoE5 and PoE95 level were 
deliberately engineered to capture a broader range of portfolio risks (i.e. consistent with the 
100 year stochastic spot price data set). 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠
𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 − (2.25 ∙ 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠) + �𝛼𝛼 ∙ �𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛−1,𝑖𝑖 + 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖� 2⁄ � ∙ (1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠) | 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 = 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 − 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 , (2) 
where: 
𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠
𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 = modelled prices of Accumulated Portfolio of Calendar Year Swaps s in  
                𝑦𝑦ear n and iteration i (i = 1..500 for each year, n) 
𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 = long run average of the 3-Year Accumulated Portfolio of Swaps 
𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 = standard deviation of the 3-Year Accumulated Portfolio of Swaps 
 
44 It is worth noting that using one year-ahead data, swaps did trade at a slight premium to ex post spot prices.  For the 3-Year 
Accumulated Portfolio, the extent of the rebound effect and comparatively slow reversion to mean (due to pronounced lags in 
new entrant grid connections) was not predicted 3-years ahead, and this produced a negative margin over the cycle. 
0
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Calendar year
Fair Value  Ex Post (Payout)
3-Yr Accumulated Portfolio
10-Yr Average Swap
10-Yr Average Fair Value Ex Post
Avg of Traded 
Swaps
Fair Value 
Swap Ex Post
Stochastic Spot 
Prices
2010-19 
Swaps Accum. 
Modelled 
Accum. Swap 
Observations 8,186              10                   100                    10                   10                   
Average 69.46              72.36              73.15                 69.36              73.83              
Std Deviation 18.53              25.58              24.47                 12.13              13.01              
Coeff. Variation 0.27                0.35                0.33                   0.17                0.18                
PoE5 106.69            105.92            109.78               90.55              97.00              
PoE95 47.14              46.03              37.85                 59.12              53.77              
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𝛼𝛼 = estimated Swap coefficient of 0.7545  
𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠
𝑛𝑛 = ex post Fair Value of Swaps from stochastic spot prices in  
   year n and iteration i 
𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 = expected long run Swap Premium (set to 1%)  
 
4. Models  
Plant valuations require integration of two sequential models, i). Unit Commitment Model, 
and ii). Stochastic DCF Valuation Model.  As (Hlouskova et al., 2005) explain when 
operational constraints are put aside, the problem at hand for the Unit Commitment Model is 
a simple one.  In each trading interval: 
 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 �> 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶, 𝑞𝑞 = 𝑞𝑞� < 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶, 𝑞𝑞 = 0,                          (3) 
 
where:  
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 is the spot price of electricity,  
𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 are Marginal Running Costs,  
𝑞𝑞 is quantity produced, 
𝑞𝑞� is maximum continuous rating.   
 
Gross profit 𝜋𝜋 in each trading interval must capture the real option value of the spark spread, 
viz. turning the OCGT on and producing to physically back forward derivatives 𝑣𝑣 sold at 
contract strike price 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐, or alternatively, turning the OCGT off and exhausting gains from 
exchange in organised spot markets46: 
 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 �> 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶,𝜋𝜋 = 𝑣𝑣(𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 − 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶) + (𝑞𝑞� −  𝑣𝑣) ∙ �𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 − 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶�< 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶,𝜋𝜋 = 𝑣𝑣�𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 − 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒�,     (4) 
 
Of course, gas turbine unit commitment decisions are characterised by numerous constraints 
and non-convexities including start-up costs47, start-up times, ramp-rate, minimum stable 
loads, minimum run-times, planned inspections and forced outages.  Axiomatically, in 
energy-only markets with a high Market Price Cap, failing to capture these over-values 
OCGT plant, hence the purpose of a Unit Commitment Model.  
 
4.1 Unit Commitment Model  
The Model simulates plant dispatch with an objective function of maximising spread options 
inherent in spot prices subject to the various constraints and non-convexities that characterise 
OCGT plant.  Essential model inputs include gas turbine technical and financial data (Table 
1), and the 30-minute spot price data array.  Model structure is as follows: 
 
Let Y be the ordered set of Years. 
 
𝑛𝑛 ∈ {1. . |𝑌𝑌|} ∧ 𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑌𝑌,        (5) 
 
Let H be the ordered set of Half-Hour trading intervals in each year 𝑛𝑛. 
 
𝑡𝑡 ∈ {1. . |𝐻𝐻|} ∧ ℎ𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻,        (6) 
 
Let 𝑄𝑄� be the ordered set of gas turbine units on site at their maximum continuous rating. 
 
𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1. . |𝑄𝑄�|} ∧ 𝑞𝑞�𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑄𝑄� ,         (7) 
 
45 As with Eq.(1), the second term in Eq.(2) ensures there is no systematic bias towards ‘more hedging’ given 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 is non-negative.  
In Eq.(2) the addition 𝛼𝛼 coefficient (i.e. at 0.75) in the estimation process ensures the overall average is ~$73/MWh.   
46 The structure of Eq.(4) implies forward derivatives are Swaps rather than Caps.  To convert to Caps, premia needs to be 
included in each trading interval. 
47 The maintenance regime of Frame gas turbines undertaking peaking duties are driven by the number of unit starts.  
Maintenance of aeroderivative gas turbines are driven by running hours.  Both technologies use additional fuel during start-up. 
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Let 𝐾𝐾 be the ordered set of wind turbines. 
 
𝑤𝑤 ∈ {1. . |𝐾𝐾|} ∧ 𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 ∈ 𝐾𝐾,        (8) 
 
Marginal Running Costs include Fuel 𝐹𝐹�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡� and Variable Operations & Maintenance costs 
�𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗
𝑡𝑡�.  Fuel 𝐹𝐹�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡� is non-convex because of start-up quantity 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 with marginal fuel 
consumed at the plant’s heat rate ℎ𝑗𝑗.  Each coefficient is strictly non-negative. 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  is the price 
of fuel. Once operational, 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 reduces because Fuel consumed during the start-up sequence 
�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� is sunk.   
 
∃ 𝑞𝑞�𝑗𝑗 �𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  = 𝐹𝐹 �𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡� ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡   � 𝐹𝐹 �𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡� = 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1 = 0, 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 + ℎ𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1 > 0, ℎ𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡,    (9) 
 
Following unit commitment, quantity produced 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 is bounded by maximum rated capacity 𝑞𝑞�𝑗𝑗 
and minimum stable load 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗. 
 
𝑞𝑞𝐽𝐽 <  𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 < 𝑞𝑞�𝑗𝑗  ∀ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 > 0,       (10) 
   
Plant is subject to planned �𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗,𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 � and forced �𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 � outages of one week and 6% per annum 
respectively.  Planned outages are pre-scheduled in mild seasons.   Forced outages (including 
failed starts) are random, occurring throughout the year. Available capacity is therefore 
stochastic and modelled at the station level for each trading interval: 
 
∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
𝑡𝑡|𝑄𝑄�|
𝑗𝑗=1 | 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟[0. .1] < 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡  ⋀ 𝑡𝑡 ≠ 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗,𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 , 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟[0. .1] ≥ 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 ⋁ 𝑡𝑡 =  𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗,𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 , 0,      (11) 
 
Gas turbines are subject to a start-up sequence�𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗� which means maximum output in the first 
trading interval following unit commitment is not feasible: 
 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 > 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  ∧ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1 �= 0, �𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡� 
≠ 0, 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡,                         (12) 
 
Gas turbines have practical minimum economic run-times.  Unit commitment is subject to 
expected electricity prices 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡  over a look-ahead period (𝑙𝑙) nominally set to two hours to 
ensure units are not started for brief periods of marginal value.48  Conversely, if already 
operational and marginal value is expected, units remain in service: 
 
𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙t   ≥ MRC𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡,𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡−1 > 0 ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 ≥ MRC𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡,𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡  
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 0.       (13) 
 
In the present exercise, key financial and operational outputs for each trading interval t in 
each year n are extracted and rolled-up into an ordered set of annual results (𝑛𝑛 = 100).  
 
Operational Results 
Operational results include plant output (𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛), unit starts 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛, fuel consumed 𝐹𝐹(𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛) and plant 
operating hours 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛.  
 
 
48 The consequence of Eq.(13) is that the station will sometimes start early in anticipation of a major price spike thereby 
capturing realistic behaviour under uncertainty, and may not generate during brief spikes of low profitability thereby avoiding 
unnecessary operating hours and/or unit starts.  However, subject to Eq.(11) unit commitment will always hit major price spikes 
reflecting an assumption of high quality short-term price forecasting. 
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𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛 = ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡|𝐻𝐻|𝑡𝑡=1|𝑄𝑄|𝑗𝑗=1 ,         (14) 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛 = ∑ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡|𝐻𝐻|𝑡𝑡=1|𝑄𝑄|𝑗𝑗=1  |       𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = �1, 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 > 0 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1 = 00,     (15) 
 
𝐹𝐹(𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛) =  𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛 + ℎ𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛 ,       (16) 
 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛 = ∑ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡|𝐻𝐻|𝑡𝑡=1|𝑄𝑄|𝑗𝑗=1 | 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 �> 0,𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = (1 ⋅ 𝑇𝑇)0,  𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = 0,     (17) 
 
where 𝑇𝑇 = 0.5, given 30-minute dispatch intervals. 
 
Financial Results 
OCGT Net Revenue (𝑅𝑅n) are derived from electricity spot sales (𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛), plus cap sales (𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛), 
less cap payouts (𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 ), less Marginal Running Costs. Net Revenues are determined for each of 
the 100 years of results via Eq. (18)-(21).  
 
𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚
𝑛𝑛 = ∑ ∑ �𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡  ∙ 𝑇𝑇�,|𝐻𝐻|𝑡𝑡=1|𝑄𝑄|𝑗𝑗=1        (18)  
𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐
𝑛𝑛 = ∑ ∑ �𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛  ∙ 𝑇𝑇�,|𝐻𝐻|𝑡𝑡=1|𝑄𝑄|𝑗𝑗=1        (19)  
𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝
𝑛𝑛 = ∑ [𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(0,𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒) ∙ 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 ∙  𝑇𝑇],|𝐻𝐻|𝑡𝑡=1      (20) 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛 = 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 −  𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 − �∑ ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡|𝐻𝐻|𝑡𝑡=1|𝑄𝑄|𝑗𝑗=1 �,       (21)  
where 
 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛   = volume of caps sold (MW)  
 p𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛   = price of caps sold ($/MWh) 
 𝑇𝑇   = duration of each time period t (in hours) 
 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒   = strike price of cap contracts ($/MWh) 
 
For merchant wind plant, Net Revenues (𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛) comprise spot market revenues (𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 ) and 
difference payments from Swap sales (𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛): 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚
𝑛𝑛 = ∑ ∑ �𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡  ∙ 𝑇𝑇�,|𝐻𝐻|𝑡𝑡=1|𝐾𝐾|𝑤𝑤=1         (22) 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠
𝑛𝑛 = ∑ ∑ �𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 ∙ �𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛�  ∙ 𝑇𝑇�,|𝐻𝐻|𝑡𝑡=1|𝐾𝐾|𝑤𝑤=1        (23) 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 − �∑ ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡|𝐻𝐻|𝑡𝑡=1|𝐾𝐾|𝑤𝑤=1 �  | 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = �𝑞𝑞𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡  × 𝑇𝑇�.   (24) 
 
where 
 𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛   = volume of swaps sold (MW)  
 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛   = price of swaps sold ($/MWh) 
 
  
4.2 Stochastic DCF Valuation Model  
The basic structure of the Stochastic DCF Valuation Model aligns with a conventional 
unlevered, post-tax nominal DCF Model with 25 years duration (n =1..25), 12% expected 
equity returns and 6% debt finance (i.e. 9.3% and 2.4% real post-tax, respectively), 30% 
corporate taxes and imputed capital structure of 40/60 debt/equity.  The Model uses a Monte 
Carlo engine and sub-sampling process to randomly populate each future year n from the 100-
year array contained in the Unit Commitment Model thus generating an inherently volatile 
price and production series that captures full business cycle data inherent in spot and forward 
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energy markets (for example, see Figure 10 Cap price traces).  The Monte Carlo engine is 
iterated 500 times (i = 500) to produce 500 distinct plant valuations and a valuation 
distribution similar to (Hlouskova et al., 2005). 
 
OCGT Valuation Model 
The ith valuation of Plant Q is calculated as follows:  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑄𝑄
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 ∑ �𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 −  𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 − �∑ ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖|𝐻𝐻|𝑡𝑡=1|𝑄𝑄|𝑗𝑗=1 � − 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛 − 𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖� ,25𝑛𝑛=1   (25) 
 
where 
𝑉𝑉𝑄𝑄
𝑖𝑖  = (Present) Value of OCGT (ith iteration) 
𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄
𝑛𝑛  = Fixed Costs (i.e. Fixed Operations & Maintenance, Insurances etc) 
𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 = Cash taxes payable 
 
The mid-point valuation of 500 iterations is therefore: 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑄𝑄 = 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑄𝑄 ∑ �∑ �𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 −  𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 − �∑ ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖|𝐻𝐻|𝑡𝑡=1|𝑄𝑄|𝑗𝑗=1 � − 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛 − 𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖�25𝑛𝑛=1 �500𝑖𝑖=1 𝑖𝑖⁄ , (26) 
 
Merchant Wind Valuation Model 
The ith valuation of Portfolio K is calculated as follows:  
 
𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ∑ �𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 − �∑ ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖|𝐻𝐻|𝑡𝑡=1|𝐾𝐾|𝑤𝑤=1 � − 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛 − 𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖�25𝑛𝑛=1 ,   (27) 
 
where 
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾
𝑖𝑖  = Present Value of Wind plant (ith iteration) 
𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾
𝑛𝑛  = Wind plant Fixed Costs 
 
The mid-point valuation follows the same procedure as Eq.(26). 
 
Merchant Wind & Gas Turbine Valuation Model - Optimisation 
Integration of merchant wind and OCGT plant requires stand-alone hedge portfolios to be re-
organised.  Specifically, optimal swap levels are increased to average portfolio output, with 
Cap derivatives reduced to enable the OCGT plant to form a real option against Swaps in 
light of intermittent output.  The volume and structure of portfolio derivatives 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛 is therefore: 
 
𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛 = ?̀?𝑣𝑠𝑠 + ?̀?𝑣c | ?̀?𝑣𝑠𝑠 ≅ 𝑒𝑒(𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹) ∀ 𝑛𝑛 ∧ ?̀?𝑣c = max(0,𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 − 𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠) ∀ 𝑛𝑛, (28) 
 
where ex ante, expected average portfolio output is ~80MW.49 
 
The ith valuation of the Portfolio therefore is: 
 
𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾,𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾,𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 ∑ ��𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖� + �?̀?𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 + ?̀?𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 −  ?̀?𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖� − ��∑ ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖|𝐻𝐻|𝑡𝑡=1|𝑄𝑄|𝑗𝑗=1 � +25𝑛𝑛=1
�∑ ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑤𝑤
𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖|𝐻𝐻|
𝑡𝑡=1|𝐾𝐾|𝑤𝑤=1 �� − ∑𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄,𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛 − 𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖�.      (29) 
 
The mid-point valuation follows the same procedure as Eq.(26). 
 
5. Modelling Results 
A rising view in energy economics and policy literature is OCGT plant are increasingly 
unprofitable due to VRE merit order effects and lower run times, implying capacity markets 
or strategic reserves may be essential (Hach and Spinler, 2016; Höschle et al., 2017; Bublitz 
et al., 2019; Milstein and Tishler, 2019).  But recall from Section 2: 
 
 
49 The level of hedging would ideally be optimised for expected changes in quarterly conditions rather than limited to pre-set 
annual hedge levels over a 25 year period.  However, this simplifying assumption reduces calculations across the 25 years x 500 
iterations considerably. 
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1. energy-only markets have always been ‘tough neighbourhoods’ from an investment 
commitment perspective, especially peaking plant (Peluchon, 2003; Bidwell and 
Henney, 2004; Finon, 2008); 
  
2. vertical integration has historically provided a means by which firms could navigate 
missing money and forward market imperfections (Simshauser, 2010; Simshauser, 
Tian and Whish-Wilson, 2015; Newbery, 2016); 
 
3. merit order effects have multiple dimensions over multiple timeframes (Hirth, 2013; 
Hirth, Ueckerdt and Edenhofer, 2016) and eventually produce near-perfect market 
conditions for OCGT plant entry; and  
 
4. merchant stochastic VRE plant are analogous to, or a mirror image of, stochastic 
loads. Consequently, integration of merchant VRE plant with OCGT plant should 
also, in theory, present transactional gains.   
 
Testing this concept requires three sequential valuations i). merchant OCGT plant, ii). 
merchant Wind Portfolio, and iii). an integrated portfolio comprising i) and ii).  The marginal 
value of the integrated portfolio result can be quickly derived by comparison with the Sum-
of-the-Parts, i.e. iii). vs. (i) + (ii). 
 
5.1 OCGT Valuation 
Recall the OCGT plant has an overnight capital cost of ~$1050/kW or $102.3m.50  Applying 
the Section 3 data and Section 4 modelling sequence produces the OCGT plant valuation 
distribution outlined in Table 5 and Figure 13.   
 
 OCGT valuation results  
 
 
The midpoint valuation is $88.6 million with PoE5 and PoE95 valuations of $105.4m and 
$71.6, respectively.  PoE50 Annual Cash Flows (i.e. ∑ ∑ = 1250025𝑛𝑛=1 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒500𝑖𝑖=1 ) is 
$9.8 million per annum, and the PoE95 result is $4.3 million.  Even after accounting for a 
portfolio of $300 Cap derivatives, annual cash flow variations demonstrate why raising debt 
against a stand-alone OCGT plant is challenging.    
 
OCGT production duties are also summarised in Table 5 – average ACF is 7.9% or 692 
operating hours (233 starts per unit) with significant inter-year variation.  During cyclical 
market highs, OCGT duties surge to 24.5% ACF, and fall to just 75 Operating Hours (0.9% 
ACF) during market lows.    
 
Of critical importance is the mid-point OCGT plant valuation ($88.6 million) relative to entry 
costs of $102.3 million – a shortfall of -$13.7m (-13.4%).51  Given the nature of DCF Models, 
stand-alone investment commitment in new OCGT plant is more likely to occur during 
cyclical market highs.   
  
 
50 That is, 3 x 32.5MW x $1050/kW = $102.3 million or ~US$69m. 
51 This result is to be expected – recall plant entry costs are ~$14/MWh and modelled Caps are ~$13/MWh over the cycle. 
3 x 30MW OCGT Plant Valuation ACF Unit Starts Op. Hours
($m) (%) (#) (Hrs) 
Plant Valuation (Avg of 500 iterations) 88.6                7.9                  233                 692                 
PoE5 Valuation 105.4              10.4                824                 915                 
PoE95 Valuation 71.6                5.7                  107                 497                 
Minimum Valuation` 57.7                0.9                  35                   75                   
Maximum Valuation` 117.3              24.5                912                 2,147              
Avg Annual Cash Flow (500 iterations) 9.8                  7.9                  233                 692                 
PoE95 Cash Flow (500 iterations) 4.3                  5.7                  107                 497                 
` Min and Max Annual Capacity Factor, Unit Starts and Operating Hour results are for a single year.  Valuations relate to 25 years.
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 OCGT Valuation Distribution (500 iterations)  
 
 
5.2 Merchant Wind Portfolio Valuation 
To the best of my knowledge, merchant VRE plant in energy-only markets is a new asset 
class.  The NEMs ~30 incumbent and new entrant exhibits emerging over 2017-2019 are 
therefore “trail-blazing”.  Regardless of how VRE become merchant, participation in forward 
derivative markets will become important from a financial management perspective vis-à-vis 
raising and servicing debt.  Figure 15 subsequently reveals why this is the case.   
 
Introducing forward derivatives into a VRE portfolio lowers future price risk – a crucial 
financial management objective – but simultaneously amplifies intermittency/quantity risk.   
Axiomatically, as Baseload Swap levels are increased, confidence limits around asset-backed 
generation falls.  The risk here is obvious.  If the Wind Portfolio enters into 100MW of 
Swaps, output falls to zero and spot prices go to VoLL ($14,700/MWh), derivative losses 
equal $1.47 million per hour. 
 
But this does not mean merchant VRE cannot, or should not, enter into forward Swap 
commitments.  In reality, a 1MW Baseload Swap can be asset-backed by a 250MW wind 
portfolio with confidence because the Dispatched-Weighted Price of the 1st (priority-
allocated) MW of production invariably has a very strong correlation to annual average spot 
prices for which Swaps are settled against.  Furthermore, across a typical reporting period, 
collective long spot exposures will offset some minimum quantity of short exposure periods.  
Transient imbalances (i.e. short & long positions) are, after all, fungible within a reporting 
period.  The task is to assess the relative effectiveness of marginal MWs of Baseload Swaps 
against wind portfolio output.  
 
Figure 14 illustrates this relationship by presenting Dispatch-Weighted Prices for wind 
production.  The two solid black lines highlight upper- and lower-bound simulations, with the 
former commencing from 99% of the average annual spot prices, continuously deteriorating 
to 93%.  The lower-bound simulation commences at 97% and deteriorates 82%.  These are 
average Dispatch-Weighted Price results.  The dashed line-series illustrates marginal 
Dispatch-Weighted Price for the upper- and lower-bound production simulations.  What this 
demonstrates is asset-backed performance of hedge commitments begins to deteriorate as 
hedge levels are raised, absent ‘firming’ via financial or real options.   
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 Asset-Backed Production by Wind  -  
Average & Marginal Dispatch-Weighted Prices vs Hedge Commitment Levels (MW) 
 
 
Figure 15, perhaps the most important result in this article, illustrates how the 250MW wind 
portfolio performs against varying levels of Swaps by comparing expected earnings (PoE50) 
with 1-in-20 year downside earnings (PoE95).  Specifically, the PoE50 and PoE95 Annual 
Cash Flows from 500 iterations, for 25 years, for each of 25 forward hedging set-points (0-
120MW in 5MW increments) are measured in Figure 15, representing the results of 312,500 
simulated years in aggregate.  Hedge levels are measured on the x-axis, and y-axis measures 
Cash Flows.   
 
The relationship between PoE50 and PoE95 Cash Flows, which can be loosely defined as a 
modified Sharpe Ratio52, is an important one as it provides an indication of the level of risk 
(PoE50 – PoE95), given expected returns (PoE50 Cash Flows) of the underlying operating 
asset: 
 250MW (31.2% ACF) Merchant Wind Portfolio with Forward Swaps  
 
 
52 Of course, the Sharpe Ratio measures the risk-adjusted returns of a portfolio �𝑒𝑒�𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝� − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝� �. 
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PoE50 Cash Flows are largely constant throughout the 0-120MW trading range, implying 
Swaps are priced at Fair Value over the business cycle.  But notice the material improvement 
in downside/PoE95 Cash Flows (and modified Sharpe Ratio) as Swaps approach 75MW, then 
deteriorating sharply thereafter.     
 
That modelling reveals an optimal hedge level of ~75MW is not entirely surprising.  A 
250MW Wind Portfolio at 32.1% ACF produces average output of ~78MW (i.e. 250MW x 
32.1% = 78MW).  Fixing the price of expected annual output should reduce earnings 
volatility provided Swaps are fairly priced and asset-backed (noting short/long positions are 
fungible within a reporting period).   
 
The incumbent Merchant Wind Portfolio was valued in the Stochastic DCF Valuation Model 
with a hedge setpoint comprising 75MW of Swaps and iterated 500 times, producing an (ex-
certificate/ex-carbon price) valuation of $319.053 as outlined in Table 6 and Figure 16.  
 
 Wind Portfolio Valuation 
 
 
 Wind Valuation Distribution 
 
However, a cautionary note and shortcoming associated with Figure 15: 
 
• as hedge levels increase, upside earnings are truncated – a PoE5 Cash Flow series 
would be a mirror image of PoE95; and 
 
• the risk of critical ‘intra-period liquidity events’ and black swan events (i.e. >PoE95) 
are not evident through annual modelling results.  In a (credible) scenario where 
 
53 Recall the wind portfolio is an incumbent.  While not the purpose of this article, the depreciated valuation as an incumbent is 
~$450 million and the combined value of electricity sales (per Table 6) and renewable certificate sales (per footnote 38) exceeds 
this amount. 
250MW Wind Portfolio Valuation ACF 
($ Million) (%) 
Plant Valuation (Avg of 500 iterations) 319.0              31.1                
PoE5 Valuation 348.1              33.9                
PoE95 Valuation 288.5              28.2                
Minimum Valuation` 268.9              28.2                
Maximum Valuation` 366.5              33.9                
Avg Annual Cash Flow (500 iterations) 34.0                31.1                
PoE95 Cash Flow (500 iterations) 21.0                28.2                
` Min and Max Annual Capacity Factor results are for a single year.  Valuations relate to 25 years.
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75MW of swaps with average strike price of (say) $65/MWh due to moderate market 
conditions encounter a supply-side shock associated with stochastic spot price Year 
14 (n=14 of 100), derivative losses of $3.4m occur in a single week54 and cumulative 
revenues for the 3rd Quarter fall to zero before accounting for fixed, variable and 
financing costs.  Such a scenario would result in financial distress.  However, this 
also represents the motivation for integration with OCGT plant – while intra-year 
results are not presented, modelled results reveal integration completely neutralises 
3rd Quarter losses in Year 14. 
 
5.3 Integrated Portfolio of 250MW Wind & 90MW OCGT 
Integrating OCGT and Wind requires forward commitments to be reorganised.  Recall the 
OCGT has 80MW of Caps, and Wind has 75MW of Swaps.  In the integrated case, Swaps are 
raised to average portfolio output of ~80MW and Caps are reduced to 30MW in order to 
allow the OCGT to physically back marginal Swaps – thus neutralising intra-period liquidity 
events.  Comparative valuation results are presented in Table 7.  
 Integrated Portfolio Valuation 
 
 
Columns A and B in Table 7 reproduce Tables 5-6 for ease of comparison. Column C is a 
simple Sum-of-the-Parts (i.e. Columns A + B).  Column D presents the integrated Wind and 
OCGT Portfolio.  Column E isolates Portfolio Effects (i.e.  Column D – C). 
 
Note the Sum-of-the-Parts valuation is $407.6 million whereas the integrated portfolio 
valuation is $432.0 million.  The Portfolio Effect is therefore +$24.4 million.  This is a critical 
finding.  When Portfolio Effects ($24.4) are added to OCGT valuation ($88.6), economics tip 
in favour of OCGT investment commitment with a combined value of $113.0 million, ~$10 
million above entry costs. 
 
Note Wind+OCGT Portfolio results (Column D) exceed Sum-of-the-Parts (Column C) in 
every metric.  Portfolio valuations are higher, and crucially, PoE50 and PoE95 Cash Flows 
improve materially.  The valuation distribution is presented in Figure 17. 
 
  
 
54 Specifically, settlement week 30 of 52. 
Valuation  OCGT Wind Simple Sum of the Parts
Wind+OCGT 
Portfolio 
Portfolio 
Effects
A B C D E 
C = (A + B) E = (D - C) 
($ Million) ($ Million) ($ Million) ($ Million) ($ Million) 
Plant Valuation (Avg of 500 iterations) 88.6                319.0              407.6              432.0              24.4                
PoE5 Valuation 105.4              348.1              453.5              482.7              29.1                
PoE95 Valuation 71.6                288.5              360.1              382.0              21.9                
Minimum Valuation` 57.7                268.9              326.7              330.4              3.7                  
Maximum Valuation` 117.3              366.5              483.8              518.4              34.6                
Avg Annual Cash Flow (500 iterations) 9.8                  34.0                43.9                45.8                1.9                  
PoE95 Cash Flow (500 iterations) 4.3                  21.0                25.3                29.0                3.7                  
Modified Sharpe Ratio 0.56                0.38                0.42                0.37                
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 Integrated Portfolio Valuation Distribution 
 
 
6. Policy implications and concluding remarks 
The historically high cost of renewables and generalised merit order effects meant continuity 
of VRE entry had been reliant on Australia’s 20% Renewable Portfolio Standard and other 
policy initiatives.  As latter-stage merit order effects played out (i.e. rebound effects) and 
entry costs plunged, merchant and semi-merchant renewables emerged as an asset class, 
augmented by older incumbent VRE plants as legacy PPAs expired.  In aggregate, the 
merchant VRE fleet forms a small but meaningful (15-20%) component of the NEMs total 
VRE plant stock.   
 
For debt to be structured and allocated on commercial terms to merchant VRE, some 
minimum level of forward hedging is desirable.  The benefits of doing so have not been 
quantified here, and so this represents an area for futher research.  But the analysis in Section 
5 demonstrated ‘hedging to average’ wind output can be financially prudent, even with a 
diminishing Dispatch-Weighted Price running at non-trivial discounts to baseload prices.  
Risk-adjusted expected earnings (PoE50 relative to PoE95 Cash Flows) improved markedly.   
 
It was noted annual results mask intra-period liquidity risk.  This is not critical when 
integrated with OCGT plant as it is capable of neutralising intra-period events.  This is, of 
course, the basis of vertical integration with retail load.   
 
On a stand-alone basis, OCGT investment was marginally sub-economic.  When combined 
with merchant Wind, Portfolio Effects on underlying valuations were material, tipping the 
economics in favour of investment commitment.  Risk-adjusted returns (i.e. PoE50 and 
PoE95 Cash Flows) by comparison to Sum-of-the-Parts were also significantly tighter, 
making the integrated asset portfolio more bankable.  Whether these results can be 
generalised to other jurisdictions is contingent on the relative pattern of VRE output, and 
critically, the relationship between VRE Dispatch-Weighted Prices and baseload prices.  The 
gap between the two is essential to the economics of peaking plant investment. 
 
With merchant VRE, investment error and commodity price risks are allocated to investors.  
And there are, evidently, strong portfolio incentives to invest in dispatchable OCGT plant.  As 
such, this emerging asset class appears to be a helpful development vis-à-vis environmental 
objectives and Resource Adequacy.  It would seem Resource Adequacy in energy-only 
markets can be maintained through two forms of portfolio integration, i). the historically 
dominant vertical integration of OCGT with retail supply, and now ii). OCGT with merchant 
VRE.   
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For policymakers, these results are important.  While energy-only markets are ‘tough 
neighbourhoods’ from an investment perspective, Section 5 analysis appears to contradict the 
notion that energy-only markets are increasingly incompatible with delivering environmental 
objectives and Resource Adequacy.  The NEM’s South Australian region has delivered one of 
the highest VRE market shares in the world (>50%), and the broader NEM has met the 
Reliability Criteria under a wide array of economic and technical conditions with very few 
exceptions over the past 20 years.  It is to be noted system security events are becoming 
increasingly problematic with high VRE – but this relates to the nature and design of 
Frequency Control Ancillary Service markets and other system security-related issues55, not 
matters of environmental policy or Resource Adequacy vis-à-vis the energy only market 
design.  
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